Ideas from 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal' by Jonathan Kvanvig [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)' (ed/tr Steup/Turri/Sosa) [Wiley Blackwell 2014,978-0-470-67209-9]].

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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

19566

Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth

19568

Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

19567

The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe